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Strategic alliances (SA) are trading partnerships and new business forms that enable 
participating firms to achieve strategic objectives beyond their existing capabilities by providing 
for mutual resource exchanges (technologies, skills, or products).  SA involves two or more 
partner firms that: (1) remain legally independent after the alliance is formed; (2) share benefits 
and managerial control over the performance of the partnership; and (3) make continuing 
contributions to the partnership (Yoshino and Rangan 1995:5). SA encompass both short-term 
project-based and long-term equity-based cooperation between firms with varying degrees of 
vertical integration and interdependence, and/or horizontal synergies. SA combine the assets and 
capabilities with the liabilities of all partners.   
 
Conceptual Overview 
SA have a long history although only recently have been recognized as an essential 
institutional form that supports collaborative activities. The main research on SA has emerged at 
the cross-road of multiple disciplines such as: strategic management, organization theory, 
political science, international business and economic theory of cooperation. Much of the 
theoretical foundations were established with the edited volume by Contractor and Lorange 
(1988) on co-operative strategies in international business, with contributions from Buckley and 
Casson on a ‘theory of co-operation’, Contractor and Lorange on ‘the strategy and economic 
basis for cooperative ventures’, Harrigan on ‘partner asymmetries’. Other contributions include 
Cunningham & Calligan (1991) on ‘competitiveness through networks of relationships’, Hamel 
(1991) on ‘inter-partner learning in strategic alliances’, Auster (1994) on ‘theoretical 
perspectives on inter-organizational linkages’, Gulati (1995) on the relationship between 
repeated transactions and trust’, Doz (1996) on the ‘learning processes in strategic alliances’,  
and on ‘management of collaborations in technology based product markets’. Some of the 
leading research questions explored were: why alliances are set-up (Gugler, 1992); the 
international context of cross—border strategic alliances (Snodgrass, 1993), or how to achieve 
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success in international strategic alliances (Bleeke and Ernst (eds.) 1993), Mohr and Spekman, 
1994).  
 Different alliance forms represent different approaches that partners adopt to control their 
interdependence.  Different types of SA are also associated with different legal forms, which 
enable firms to control the resources allocation and the distribution of benefits among the 
partners (Knoke 2001: 121-128; Todeva and Knoke, 2005). 
 
Figure 1. Types of Strategic Alliances, Partnerships and Sharing Agreements 
 
SA typically include diverse organizations, such as suppliers, buyers, competitors, 
regulatory authorities, financial and credit institutions, that together comprise the “economic 
organization of production” (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990).  The most established legal forms and 
types of SA are: cooperatives (a coalition of small enterprises that combine, coordinate, and 
manage their collective resources), supply chains (based on long-term procurement contracts 
between firms), sourcing agreements (including outsourcing and subcontracting various business 
functions and operations), joint ventures (equity and non-equity based agreements between two 
parent companies that establish a new legal entity), licensing (knowledge-based agreements that 
transfer patented information for the use, manufacture and distribution of products and services), 
franchising (contract-based organizational structure for entering new markets based on a transfer 
of a business concept with corresponding operational guidelines from a franchisor to a franchisee 
for a fee), management contracts (used by businesses to acquire management services such as: 
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facilities/ warehouse/ operations/ or fund management), turnkey contracts (large international 
consortiums formed for the construction of new production facilities that include investors, 
governments, engineering firms and multiple contractors, and include responsibilities for the 
provision of resources, technology, know-how and management during the development, 
installation and the subsequent exploitation phases), strategic industrial cooperation agreements 
(large contractual business networks based on joint multi-party strategic control and sharing 
responsibilities for performance outcomes; may include a multitude of specific alliance forms), 
counter-trade agreements (large multi-party agreements supported by governments, where 
payments are agreed in the form of barters, offsets, counter-purchase, and buy-back), research 
and development (R&D) consortia (inter-firm agreements for collaboration in research and 
development), or various business associations and standard groups that make strategic 
decisions implemented via membership and participation (Todeva and Knoke, 2005). 
Bleeke and Ernst (1993) summarize four generic needs of firms seeking alliance: cash, 
scale, skills, access, or their combinations. Among the main motives investigated in the literature 
are the following four groups: 
Organizational motives - learning and various kinds of acquisition and internalization of 
tacit, collective and embedded knowledge skills and capabilities; competence building; 
organizational restructuring; to enhance productive capacity; to acquire means of distribution; to 
recreate and extend supply chains; to achieve complementarity of goods and services to markets; 
legitimation; 
Economic motives – costs reduction / sharing; pooling of resources; risk reduction and 
risk diversification; improving performance; market seeking; obtaining economies of scale; co-
specialization; 
Strategic motives - competition sharing/ pre-emption by cooperating with potential rivals; 
to reduce uncertainty of the environment; to adjust to environmental changes; to achieve vertical 
integration; to achieve competitive advantage that enables firms to increase profits, or to gain 
future business opportunities; to develop new products and technologies; product differentiation; 
portfolio diversification; access to new technologies; converging technologies; joint R&D; 
following industry trends; 
Political motives - market development and positioning; overcoming legal and regulatory 
barriers; developing technical standards; influence and position enhancement. 
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The evolution of business relationships between alliance partners passes multiple stages 
and it does not always follow a linear process as described in Fig. 2. At the pre-relationship 
stage each of the partners identifies a set of needs and motives that support a decision to enter a 
partnership, and all firms begin to evaluate potential partners.  
 
Figure 2. The Process of Alliance Relationships 
 
Note: Adopted from Todeva (2006) 
Strategic decisions to enter an alliance are driven by evaluations of the: global 
environment (legal requirements, macro-economic policies, state regulatory activity, state 
supervision and subsidies, price controls, tax incentives, methods of contract enforcement, 
financial capital markets, and international trade regimes); industrial context (intensity of 
industry competition, social organization of specific product markets, industry supply chains and 
distribution channels, the knowledge / capital / resource / labor / technology intensity and 
supply), and organizational factors (firm sizes, visible and tacit assets, collaborative histories, 
ownership forms, corporate social capital, supply networks, product diversification, market share 
and position, human resources, managerial styles, or reputation).  
At the exploratory stage partners select each other and initiate relationships based on 
multiple implicit processes and criteria. Partner selection is affected by: operational 
interdependence, co-location, previous ties and alliance practice; the prospect of equity 
agreements, the social network of indirect ties and referrals, brokerage processes involving third-
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party introductions, evaluation of synergies, complementarity of capabilities and cultural 
proximity.  
During the negotiation stage partners frame the scope and the scale of cooperation with a 
focus on the shared activities, costs, commitments, legal liabilities and rights.  
During the process of open solicitation and seeking consensus the relational partners 
elaborate on their mutual objectives, capabilities, resources, and tasks, and reach an agreement 
how to deal with the complexity and uncertainty of collaboration. Alliance agreements are know 
as relational contracting which embraces not only unspecifiable terms and conditions in complex 
and open-ended contracts, but also collective interorganisational strategies for eliminating rivalry 
through tacit coordination. Relational contracting rely on such diverse coordination mechanisms 
as reciprocity norms, interorganisational trust, and social capital embedded in multiplex 
exchanges and social interactions (Haugland, 1999, Todeva and Knoke, 2005).     
During the development stage of SA partners implement organizational change in order 
to execute the undertaken commitments. This process coincides with intensifying interactions 
across the alliance, sharing knowledge, learning and exploring activities that generate synergies 
and complementarities. Organizational learning occurs when a firm acquires, assimilates, and 
applies new information, knowledge, and skills that enhance its long-run performance and 
depends on the absorptive capacity of each firm. SA can operate as institutionalized channels for 
transferring know-how and/or synergically creating new organizational capabilities.   
The execution or implementation phase typically requires that partners pool together 
human resources and material assets; develop a practical governance structure with sufficient 
power and control; and learn how to cooperate for mutual benefit. Misunderstandings and 
conflicts arising in SA demand that partner firms master new management skills, especially 
coping with complex lateral relationships. Alliance implementation issues include: the choice of 
governance mechanisms, enhancing trust and reciprocity between partners, managing the 
integration of project staffs from different organizational cultures, and resolving conflicts that 
arise among partners with divergent expectations about the collaboration.  Metaphorically the 
octopus form of alliance management is used to symbolize classical management control from 
the center, while the network metaphor implies decentralized organizational structures and 
management processes that facilitate shared control.  
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There is no common view on what qualifies a SA as successful, and what termination 
means. In general, success means that the partners have achieved their own strategic objectives 
and have recovered their financial costs and investments. A successful collaborative agreement 
may terminate through complete project dissolution, either before or after achieving its formal 
objectives. It may also terminate by an acquisition by one of its partners, or through an 
organizational merger where the partnership serves as a transitional phase exploring the 
feasibility of fusing partners’ identities into a new enterprise. In cases of a failure of a SA 
relationship, the dissolution phase includes the attempts of partners to restore the relationship, or 
a subsequent dyadic and network communication of the termination, disengagement, sense-
making and dealing with the negative consequences at the aftermath stage (Todeva, 2006). 
 
Commentary and Future Directions 
Among the main impacts of SA on partners are: positive effect on stock prices, profits, 
productivity gains, market shares; enhanced organizational credibility; superior production 
performance; access to diverse information and capabilities; positive impacts on corporate 
shareholder value; technological complementarities; leveraging its member firms’ resource 
capabilities across the alliance network. Among the negative implications are: “locking” of 
partners into unproductive relations or blocking collaboration with other viable firms, and 
rigidity in changing order levels and trading partners  (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer 2000).   
Among the societal consequences the literature suggests increased anticompetitive 
tendencies that can hinder efficient production, restrict market access, and reduce economic 
competition, or that can lead to a greater concentration within industries that may contribute to 
higher prices, or suppress innovation. 
  Some of the questions that remain under-researched are: What conditions lead to the 
abrupt breakdown of negotiations and discourage efforts to form new partnerships? What 
institutional, relational, and organizational features of a SA push projects along increasingly 
cooperative or hostile trajectories? What measures of absorptive capacity could enable 
researchers to test hypotheses about knowledge transfers between partners and learning?  Which 
SA governance structures interact with what organizational components to boost learning and 




See also: business networks, absorptive capacity, learning, coordination 
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